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Abstract: This paper evaluates the eﬀects of introducing labor market ﬂex-
ibility into a small open economy characterized by tenure-increasing separation
taxes. The model, which is calibrated to Argentinean observations, is subjected
to diﬀerent reforms: 1) the elimination of all separation costs, 2) the introduction
of temporary contracts, and 3) the elimination of the separation costs from all
new hires while freezing them on the workers that were hired prior to the reform.
Contrary to the introduction of temporary contracts, which generate a sharp re-
cessionary adjustment, the last type of partial reform is found to be an excellent
second best alternative to a full reform.
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For the last few decades a large number of countries have been imposing policies that penal-
ize employers for ﬁring workers (examples of this type of policies are severance payments,
advance notice requirements, and procedural restrictions). In recent years, though, many of
these countries have questioned the desirability of these policies and have introduced reforms
intended to bring ﬂexibility to their labor markets. Full reforms that get rid of all ﬁring re-
strictions at once are rare. The reason is very simple: Workers that are protected under the
existing ﬁring restrictions have a strong preference to keep them, making the adoption of full
labor market reforms a politically diﬃcult task. As a consequence, labor market ﬂexibility
has typically been introduced through partial reforms and, in particular, through the intro-
duction of temporary contracts. Temporary contracts allow for a trial period during which
the employer can ﬁre a worker at little or no cost. After the trial period is over, the worker
becomes subject to regular ﬁring restrictions. By leaving the protection of previously hired
workers intact, this type of reform avoids the stiﬀ opposition met by full reform. Spain,
France, and Argentina are examples of countries that have introduced temporary contracts
in recent years.
The eﬀects of eliminating ﬁring restrictions have been extensively analyzed in the litera-
ture (e.g. Alvarez and Veracierto [3], [4], Bentolila and Bertola [7], Hopenhayn and Rogerson
[11], Millard and Mortensen [14]). More recently, a number of papers have studied the eﬀects
of temporary contracts as well (e.g. Aguirregabiria and Alonso-Borrego [1], Alonso-Borrego,
Fernandez-Villaverde and Galdon-Sanchez, [2], Alvarez and Veracierto [5], Blanchard and
Landier [8], Cabrales and Hopenhayn [9], Nagypal [17]). By considering a more realistic
type of labor market reform these papers have made an important contribution to the lit-
erature. However, they have focused on the long-run eﬀects, abstracting from the short-run
consequences. Analyzing the short-run eﬀects is important not only to obtain a more com-
plete picture of labor market reforms, but also because they may lead to a diﬀerent viewabout their potential beneﬁts. The purpose of this paper is to evaluate both the short-
run and the long-run eﬀects of temporary contracts (as well as other partial reforms) and
compare them with the consequences of introducing full reforms. Special attention will be
given to the eﬀects on unemployment, since this has been a major concern in countries that
implemented this type of policies.1
The model used is a small open economy version of Alvarez and Veracierto [5], which in
turn is based on the search model of McCall [16] and in the equilibrium unemployment model
of Lucas and Prescott [13]. Production in the economy is done on a large number of islands
that use labor as the only input of production in a constant returns to scale technology.
The islands are subject to idiosyncratic productivity shocks that follow a Markov process
over time. At the beginning of each period, workers are distributed in some way across
the islands. After the productivity shocks are realized, the workers must decide whether
to leave the islands where they are currently located and become non-employed, or to stay
on their islands and work. Agents that work start the following period on the same islands
where they are currently located. Non-employed agents have two alternatives: to search
for a new job or to leave the labor force. If an agent searches for a new job, he randomly
arrives at one of the islands at the beginning of the following period. If an agent leaves the
labor force he obtains leisure during the current period but continues to be non-employed
during the following period. Households are constituted by a large number of members that
perfectly share their employment risk. As a consequence, agents are allocated across islands
to maximize the expected discounted value of their earnings. Labor markets are competitive:
within each island, both ﬁrms and workers take the wage rate as given.
In this economy the government imposes separation taxes whenever an agent leaves an
island. The separation taxes are rebated as a lump-sum transfer to the households. A novel
1In fact, temporary contracts have often been introduced with the purpose of reducing unemployment.
Argentina’s 1995 reform is a clear example.
2feature of this paper is that the separation taxes are allowed to increase with the tenure
of a worker, unlike the previous literature which assumed a constant separation tax. The
assumption that separation taxes increase with tenure is not only a signiﬁcant gain in realism
but also will play a crucial role in some of the main results of this paper.
The model is parametrized to reproduce important observations for the Argentinean
economy.2 In particular, separation taxes are chosen to reproduce the tenure-dependent
mandated severance payments that characterize that economy. In turn, the technology
and preference parameters are chosen to reproduce the interest rate, the unemployment
rate, the labor force participation and the elasticity of labor supply for Argentina. Under
such parametrization, the model is simulated to evaluate how Argentina would react under
diﬀerent labor market reforms. Even though the model is calibrated to the Argentinean
economy it is much broader in scope: it will shed important insights on the qualitative
eﬀects of diﬀerent types of labor market reforms.
The main results of the paper are the following. First, the welfare gains of removing
all separation taxes in Argentina are found to be small: only 0.22% in terms of consump-
tion. The eﬀects on employment and output are sizable, though: in the long-run, output
increases by 3.24% while employment increases by 3.77%. Second, temporary contracts of 6
months duration, like those introduced by the 1995 Argentinean labor market reform, have
negligible eﬀects on employment, output and welfare. Third, temporary contracts of very
long duration can lead to positive welfare gains and to the same long-run outcomes as a full
reform but involve a sharp recessionary adjustment, with employment decreasing 9.5% and
output decreasing 6.4% during the ﬁrst period of the reform. Fourth, a partial labor market
reform that eliminates the separation taxes on new hires and freezes them on workers that
were hired prior to the reform, leads to the same welfare gains and long-run outcomes as
2The fact that Argentina was a small open economy at the time of its labor market reforms makes it an
ideal case to analyze using the model in this paper.
3a full reform without generating a sharp recession. In fact, employment and output start
increasing right after the introduction of the reform. Thus, this paper ﬁnds that this type of
partial labor market reform represents an excellent second best alternative to a full reform.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the economy, Section 3 describes
a competitive equilibrium, Section 4 calibrates the model, Section 5 presents the results and
Section 6 concludes the paper. A detailed appendix describes the computational algorithm.
2. The environment
The economy is populated by a representative household constituted by a large number of















where 0 < β < 1 is the discount factor, ct is consumption, ht is leisure, B>0,a n dφ > 0.
Every period each household member must allocate his full time endowment to working, to
searching, or to being out-of-the-labor-force, but not to more than one activity at the same
time. The total amount of household’s leisure is then given by
ht =1− ut − nt, (2.2)
where ut is the number of household members that are searching (i.e. are unemployed) and
nt is the number of household members that are working (i.e. are employed).
The consumption good is produced by a unit measure of islands. Each island has a linear
production function given by
yt = ztgt,
where yt is output, gt is the labor input, and zt is an idiosyncratic productivity shock to
4the island. The idiosyncratic productivity shock zt follows a ﬁnite Markov process with
transition matrix Q,w h e r eQ(z,z0) is the probability that zt+1 = z0 conditional on zt = z.
Realizations of zt are assumed to be independent across islands. Hereafter, the invariant
distribution generated by the transition matrix Q will be denoted by η.
At the beginning of every period, there is a given distribution of agents across islands.
An island cannot employ more than the total number of agents present in the island at
the beginning of the period. If an agent stays on the island where he is currently located,
he produces the consumption good and starts the following period in the same location.
Otherwise, the agent leaves the island and becomes non-employed.
A non-employed agent has two alternatives. First, he can leave the labor force in order
to contribute to household leisure. However, the following period the agent will remain
non-employed. The second alternative is to search for a new job. If the agent chooses this
alternative, he obtains zero leisure during the current period, but is randomly assigned to
one of the islands at the beginning of the following period. An important feature of the
search technology is that agents have no control upon which island they will arrive to (in
this sense, the search is “undirected”). In particular, I will assume that the agents that
search are assigned uniformly across all the islands in the economy.
3. A competitive equilibrium
This section describes a competitive equilibrium in which the government imposes employ-
ment separation taxes.3 Alvarez and Veracierto [6] show, for a similar environment, that the
equilibrium allocation is exactly the same whether the ﬁrms pay the separation taxes or the
3While the most common form of separation costs are mandated severance payments, the literature
has often chosen to model them as separation taxes. The reason is simple. Given that they represent
a bilateral transfer, severance payments would have no eﬀects if perfect recontracting were allowed for.
However, diﬀerent institutional restrictions are believed to preclude perfect recontracting from taking place.
Modelling the mandated severance payments as separation taxes is a simple way of introducing this type of
restrictions.
5workers. The only diﬀerence is in terms of the equilibrium process for wages. Given this
result and since it is much easier to describe, I will consider the case where workers pay the
taxes directly.
The policy regime treats workers with diﬀerent tenure levels diﬀerently.4 Aw o r k e rw i t h
tenure j must pay a tax τ(j) to the government if he decides to leave. When the agent
arrives at a new island his tenure level is reset to zero, independently of the agent’s tenure
in the previous island. The total amount of separation taxes collected by the government is
rebated as lump-sum transfers to the households. For simplicity, I will assume that there is
some tenure level J such that τ(j)=τ(J) for every j>J , i.e. the government treats all
w o r k e r sw i t ht e n u r el a r g e ro re q u a lt oJ the same way. In what follows, tenure levels will
then be indexed between 0 and J.
Within each island there are competitive labor markets. As a consequence, the wage
rate is simply given by the labor productivity z of the island. I will also assume that
the economy is small and open, and that households can freely borrow and lend at the
international interest rate 1+r =1 /β.5 The fact that the interest rate and the wage rate at
each type of island are independent of the aggregate state of the economy will considerably
simplify the computation of an equilibrium.
The individual state of the household is given by the assets at the beginning of the period
a and the beginning of the period distribution ψ of household members across tenure and
productivity levels. Hereafter, ψ(j,z) will denote the number of household members that
have tenure j in an island with productivity z. The aggregate state of the economy is given
by the aggregate assets A and the aggregate distribution Ψ of agents across tenure and
productivity levels.
4The tenure j of a worker in a particular island is the number of periods that the agent has been employed
on that island since the time of his arrival.
5The assumption that the international interest rate is equal to the inverse of the discount factor is
standard: It is made to guarantee stationarity.
6The household problem is described by the following Bellman equation:



























τ(j)max(0,ψ(j,z) − g (j,z)) (3.1)
+(1+r)a + T (A,Ψ)




























where g (j,z) is the number of household members with tenure j that work on an island with
productivity z,a n dT are the lump sum transfers from the government. Equation (3.1)i s
the budget constraint of the household, which states that consumption plus savings cannot
exceed income. Income is given by the total amount of wage earnings net of separation
taxes, the interest on previously accumulated assets and the lump sum transfers. Observe
that whenever workers of tenure j leave the islands where they are currently located, i.e.
whenever g (j,z) < ψ(j,z), the household must pay a tax τ(j) per reduction in that type
of workers. Equation (3.2) states that the number of household members that work under
some given tenure and productivity level cannot exceed the number of household members of
that type at the beginning of the period. Equation (3.3) gives the total number of household
members that work. Equation (3.4) states that the number of household members that in
7the following period have tenure equal to zero and is on an island with productivity z0 is
given by all household members that search during the current period and arrive at an island
with productivity z0. Observe that the probability of arriving at an island of productivity z0
is given by the corresponding probability under the invariant distribution η.T h u s ,e q u a t i o n
(3.4) uses the fact that agents that search become uniformly distributed across all the islands
in the economy. Equation (3.5) states that, for j =1 ,...,J − 1, the number of household
members that will have tenure j on an island with productivity z0 in the following period,
is given by the total number of household members that have current tenure equal to j − 1
a n dw o r ko na ni s l a n dt h a tw i l lt r a n s i tt op r o d u c t i v i t yz0 in the following period. Similarly,
equation (3.6) states that the number of household members that will have tenure J on
an island with productivity z0 at the beginning of the following period is given by all the
household members that either have tenure J −1 or tenure J during the current period and
work on an island that will transit to productivity z0 in the following period. Equation (3.7)
is the law of motion for the aggregate state of the economy, which is needed to forecast future
lump-sum transfers.
Let s(a,ψ,A,Ψ), g(j,z;a,ψ,A,Ψ),a n du(a,ψ,A,Ψ) be the optimal savings, employment,
and unemployment decision rules of the household, respectively. The equilibrium law of












g (j − 1,z;A,Ψ,A,Ψ)Q(z,z






[g (J − 1,z;A,Ψ,A,Ψ)+g (J,z;A,Ψ,A,Ψ)]Q(z,z
0),
that is, the aggregate law of motion must be generated by the optimal decisions of the
representative household. Similarly, the equilibrium lump-sum transfers T (A,Ψ) are given






τ(j)max(0,Ψ(j,z) − g (j,z;A,Ψ,A,Ψ)).
3.1. Characterization
In what follows I provide a characterization of a competitive equilibrium. To simplify the
notation I will deﬁne the economy-wide employment and unemployment decision rules as
follows
G(j,z;A,Ψ)=g (j,z;A,Ψ,A,Ψ),f o rj =0 ,..,J
U(A,Ψ)=u(A,Ψ,A,Ψ).
Let v(j,z) be the value to the household of having a household member of tenure j on an
island with productivity z and let θ be the value to the household of having a non-employed











,f o rj =0 ,...,J. (3.8)
Equation (3.8) states that a household member with tenure j on an island with productivity
z is allocated to the best of two alternatives. The ﬁrst alternative is to work on the island
and earn a wage rate equal to z during the current period. The following period the agent’s
tenure on the island increases by one period (except when the tenure is already equal to J)
while the island transits to a new productivity shock according to the transition function Q.
The second alternative is to leave the island and obtain the value of non-employment θ after
6These values are expressed in consumption units.
9payment of the separation tax τ(j).





Ψ(j,z),i fv(j,z) > θ − τ(j)





That is, for each tenure and productivity level, everybody stay if the value of staying is
larger than the value of leaving. Otherwise, everybody leave.














The household allocates non-employed members between unemployment and out-of-the-
labor-force until the household is indiﬀerent to both alternatives. As a consequence, the







The value of search is the present discounted value of randomly arriving at one of the islands
with a tenure level equal to zero. Substituting this expression in equation (3.8) shows that
there was no loss of generality in assuming that θ is a constant independent of the state of
the economy. The above indiﬀerence condition also requires that
θ = B (1 − U(A,Ψ) − N(A,Ψ))
−φ C + βθ. (3.13)
This equation states that the value of being non-employed must be equal to the value of
10being out-of-the-labor-force for one period, which is given by the marginal utility of leisure
(expressed in consumption units), plus the present value of being non-employed during the
following period. Observe that, while unemployment U (A,Ψ) and aggregate employment
N (A,Ψ) depend on the aggregate state of the economy, consumption C is constant along
the equilibrium path. The reason is that the international interest rate 1+r equals the
inverse of the discount factor β.S i n c e b o t h θ and C are constant, equation (3.13) states
that out-of-the-labor-force 1 − U (A,Ψ) − N (A,Ψ) is also constant along an equilibrium
path.



















while the equilibrium law of motion for asset holdings satisﬁes
A
0 = Y (A,Ψ)+
1
β
A − C. (3.17)
Observe from equations (3.9), (3.10), (3.11)a n d( 3 . 13) that the employment rules G(j,A,Ψ),
aggregate employment N (A,Ψ), aggregate output Y (A,Ψ), and unemployment U (A,Ψ) ac-
tually do not depend on the assets level A, only on the distribution Ψ. Solving equation
(3.17) forward, we see that the initial amount of assets A0 is an important determinant of the
consumption level C,w h i c ha ﬀects the amount of labor force participation through equation
(3.13). Labor force participation in turn determines the evolution of the distribution Ψ in
equations (3.14), (3.15), and (3.16). Thus, while the path for assets can be obtained as a
mere residual from equation (3.17), the initial amount of assets is a key determinant of the
equilibrium variables.
114. Parametrization of the benchmark economy
This section describes the choice of parameter values for the benchmark economy. There are
four parameters to be determined, β, φ, B,a n dA, the set of values for the idiosyncratic
productivity shocks z, the transition matrix Q, and the separation taxes τ(j). Their values
are selected so that the steady state corresponding to the assets level A reproduces important
observations for the Argentinean economy.7 The model time period is chosen to be half-a-
quarter to allow for the possibility of short spells of unemployment and to obtain more
detailed short-run dynamics, which is the focus of this paper.
Observe that, by assumption, the discount factor β i sr e l a t e dt ot h em o d e lr e a li n t e r e s t
rate according to 1+r = β
−1. Given that Argentina is a small open economy, it seems
reasonable to select β to match the international interest rate. For this reason, a discount
factor β =0 .9951 is chosen to generate an annual interest rate of 4%, which is approximately
the interest rate for the United States.
The set of values for the idiosyncratic productivity shocks z and the transition matrix Q
are restricted to approximate the following AR(1) process:
lnzt+1 = ρlnzt + εt+1,
where εt+1 ∼ N(0,σ2),a n d0 < ρ < 1.8 Both the persistence of the productivity shock ρ
and the variance of its innovations σ2 are key determinants of the decisions to search. As
a consequence, they are selected to generate an unemployment rate of 15% and an average
duration of unemployment equal to 4 months. This requires that ρ =0 .95 and σ2 =0 .0189.
An unemployment rate equal to 15% was the normal level for Argentina during the late
7A steady state is a competitive equilibrium such that At = A and Ψt = Ψ,f o rt =0 ,1,...,∞. For the
model economy described in this paper there exists a diﬀerent steady state for each possible value of the
assets level A.
8A total of 120 values for z will be allowed in the computations.
12nineties, while an average duration of unemployment equal to 4 months is the magnitude
reported by Galiani and Hopenhayn [10].
The weight B and the curvature φ of leisure in the utility function are important determi-
nants of the labor force participation decisions. For this reason, a weight of leisure B =0 .629
is chosen to generate a labor force participation equal to 72%, the level for Argentina during
the late nineties. In turn, a curvature parameter φ =0 .55 is chosen to generate an elastic-
ity of labor force participation with respect to wages equal to 0.7, which is consistent with
evidence for the Argentinean economy (MTSS [15]).
The amount of assets A in turn is selected to reproduce Argentina’s foreign net indebted-
n e s s .A c c o r d i n gt ot h eI M F[ 12], the international liabilities of Argentina in 1998 amounted
to $207 billion while their international assets totalled $140 billion. Since Argentina’s GDP
was $299 billion, this suggests choosing a negative value for A so that the model debt to
annual output ratio equals 22%.Av a l u eo fA = −1.92 turns out to be consistent with this
observation.
Finally, the policy regime is selected to reproduce important features of the Argentinean
system. Before the 1995 reform, which introduced temporary contracts, the Argentinean
labor market regime had been surprisingly stable. It was characterized by a lack of unem-
ployment insurance and by severance payments that increased with the worker’s tenure. In
particular, the severance payments required by the government amounted to one month of
wages per year worked. To mimic this system, the tax schedule in the model economy is
restricted to the following form:
τ (j)=jb τ,f o rj =0 ,1,...,J.
Observe that workers with zero tenure are subject to no separation taxes and that each
period of employment increases the separation taxes by b τ. The tax increment b τ was selected
so that the separation taxes after one year of employment τ(8) equal one month of model
13wages.9 This required that b τ =0 .1468. The upper bound J on tenure levels was set at
96, leading to an upper bound for the separation taxes equal to one year of wages. Given
the relatively short average duration of employment, very few workers end up making the
maximum payment.
5. Results
This section evaluates diﬀerent ways of introducing labor market ﬂexibility to the benchmark
economy that was calibrated in the previous section. The labor market reforms analyzed are
the following: 1) elimination of all separation costs, 2) introduction of temporary contracts,
and 3) elimination of the separation costs from all new hires, while freezing them on the
workers that were hired prior to the reform.
5.1. Elimination of all separation costs
Starting from the benchmark equilibrium with separation taxes (calibrated in the previous
section), the government announces that there will be no more separation costs in the future.
The reform applies not only to the new hires, but to the workers that had been hired prior
to the reform. The separation taxes are then given by
τ(j)=0for j =0 ,...,J
∗,
and the initial distribution Ψ0 is given by
Ψ0(j,z)=Ψ
∗(j,z), for j =0 ,...,J
∗, and for all z,
9Recall that one year is made of eight model periods.
14where Ψ∗ and J∗ are the steady state distribution and the upper bound on tenure levels
for the benchmark economy, respectively. Figure 1 shows the short-run eﬀects of the reform
while the second column of Table 1 shows the long-run eﬀects.10
Figure 1.A shows, for j =0 ,...,J∗, the productivity thresholds ¯ z(j) that trigger em-
ployment separation.11 Under laissez-faire, since τ(j)=0for every j, the productivity
thresholds are independent of j. On the contrary, in the benchmark economy the productiv-
ity thresholds decline with j because the separation taxes τ(j) are increasing in j.O b s e r v e
that switching to a laissez-faire regime decreases the productivity thresholds at low j’s and
increases them at high j’s. This is quite intuitive. In the economy with separation taxes
workers are very picky about accepting a new employment opportunity, but lower their
standards (once they are hired) as their separation taxes start to increase. The change in
productivity thresholds across regimes has important implications for the behavior of the
economy during the ﬁrst period of the reform. Figure 1.B shows that the decrease in the
productivity threshold corresponding to j =0makes the job-acceptance rate (deﬁned as the
fraction of the new arrivals that accept employment) increase during the ﬁrst period of the
reform and stay constant thereafter.12 On the other hand, the job-separation rate (deﬁned
as the fraction of previously employed workers who leave their islands) declines during the
ﬁrst period of the reform. The reason is that the average duration of employment is quite
short: only 15 periods. Since most of the workers have relatively small j’s, the decrease in
productivity thresholds at small j’s (in Figure 1.A) becomes the dominant eﬀect, reducing
the aggregate job-separation rate on impact. With the larger job-acceptance rate and the
10The steady state values of all variables are normalized to 100 in the benchmark economy, except for the
unemployment rate, which is measured in its original units. The welfare measure reported in Table 1 is the
permanent proportionate increase in consumption that should be given to the representative household in
the benchmark economy, to make it indiﬀerent with switching to the corresponding reform.
11The productivity threshold ¯ z(j) is the largest z satisfying that v(j,z)=θ − τ(j).
12The constant job acceptance rate is given by the sum of the probabilities η(z) across all z’s greater than
¯ z(0).
15lower job-separation rate, Figure 1.C shows that there is a slight increase in aggregate em-
ployment during the ﬁrst period of the reform. However, labor force participation increases
quite substantially due to the permanent elimination of all separation taxes. Given that
the new entrants have to search before they become employed, the economy experiences a
big increase in unemployment during the ﬁrst period of the reform. In fact the unemploy-
ment rate jumps from 15.0% to 17.1% during that initial period. The decrease in aggregate
productivity during the ﬁr s tp e r i o do ft h er e f o r ms h o w ni nF i g u r e1.D is a consequence of
the decrease in productivity thresholds at low j’s. Despite the lower aggregate productivity,
output increases because of the increase in employment. After the ﬁrst period of the reform,
there is a substantial increase in employment, as the larger number of unemployed agents
(that came from the home sector) ﬁnd jobs at the higher job-acceptance rate. Observe that
the job-separation rate starts to increase after the ﬁrst period of the reform because more
islands transit to lower productivity levels that are closer to the new lower thresholds (at
low j’s) and are therefore more likely to cross them.13 This is also the reason why aggre-
gate productivity in Figure 1.D continues to decrease after the ﬁrst period of the reform.
However, output grows at a fast pace due to the strong increase in employment.
Table 1 shows that removing all ﬁring taxes increases both the long-run job-acceptance
rate and the job-separation rate. This was anticipated because of the lower costs of reallo-
cating workers across islands. What is interesting, though, is that the increase is much larger
for the job-acceptance rate, leading to a lower long-run unemployment rate despite its initial
increase during the ﬁrst period of the reform. The particular structure of the productivity
shocks and separation taxes in the benchmark economy explains this result. Given that the
productivity shocks are very persistent, when a worker accepts employment he expects to
remain in the same island for a long time. As a consequence, he expects that the sepa-
13Observe that there is mean reversion in the productivity levels and that the mean value of z is approxi-
mately equal to 1 (much lower than the productivity thresholds at low j’s).
16ration costs will be high when he decides to leave later on. This makes the worker quite
conservative about which islands to accept employment from, leading to a relatively low job-
acceptance rate in the benchmark economy. On the other hand, given that the separation
taxes increase slowly with the tenure level, the productivity thresholds decrease very slowly
after the workers are hired. As a consequence, the probability of receiving a productivity
realization below the thresholds remains high and the job-separation rate is relatively large
in the benchmark economy. This explains why the job-separation rate increases much less
than the job-acceptance rate when moving to the laissez-faire economy.
In terms of welfare levels, we see that the beneﬁts of removing the separation taxes are
rather small: only 0.22% in terms of consumption. This contrasts with the previous literature,
which reported large welfare beneﬁts of eliminating separation taxes (e.g. Hopenhayn and
Rogerson [11], Veracierto [18]). The main reason for the diﬀe r e n tr e s u l ti st h ew a yt h a tt h e
separation taxes have been introduced. While in this paper the separation taxes increase
linearly with tenure levels, the previous literature introduced separation taxes that jump to
a constant value right after the workers become hired. This leads to very diﬀerent eﬀects.
When the separation taxes jump to a (large) constant value right after hiring, the workers
that search become very reluctant to accept employment and the workers that have been
employed (even those recently hired) become very reluctant to leave their jobs. Given their
larger eﬀects on the job acceptance and job separation rates, the constant separation taxes
become more distortionary and produce larger welfare eﬀects than the tenure-increasing
separation taxes.14
14To test this intuition I performed the following experiment. Starting from the benchmark equilibrium
reported in the ﬁrst column of Table 1, I eliminated the tenure-increasing separation taxes and introduced
a constant separation tax equal to the average separation taxes actually paid in the benchmark economy
(which amount to two months of wages). I found that the constant separation tax reduced the job acceptance
rate by 23% and the job separation rate by 45%, relative to the benchmark economy. In turn, it decreased
welfare by 1.4%.
175.2. Temporary contracts of short duration
This section analyzes the eﬀects of introducing a temporary contracts regime with the fol-
lowing characteristics. Whenever an agent enters an island for the ﬁrst time he begins a trial
period of ﬁxed duration T, during which he can leave the island at no cost. After the trial
period is over (i.e. T +1periods after the arrival to the island), the agent becomes a per-
manent worker and is subject to the same schedule of separation taxes as in the benchmark
economy. In particular, the separation taxes are now given by:
τ(j)=0 ,f o rj =0 ,...,T
τ(j)=τ
∗(j − T),f o rj = T +1 ,...,T + J
∗
and the initial distribution Ψ0 is given by
Ψ0(0,z)=Ψ
∗(0,z),f o ra l lz,
Ψ0(j,z)=0 , for j =1 ,...,T and all z,
Ψ0(j,z)=Ψ
∗(j − T,z),f o rj = T +1 ,...,T + J
∗ and all z,
where Ψ∗, J∗ and τ∗ are the steady state distribution, the upper bound on tenure levels and
the separation taxes for the benchmark economy, respectively.15 Observe that the workers
that searched during the period prior to the reform are allowed to begin a new temporary
contract during the ﬁrst period of the reform, while the workers that were employed prior to
the reform are treated as permanent workers subject to the same separation taxes that they
would have faced before the reform. In particular, if a worker was employed with tenure
j −1 during the period prior to the reform, he is considered to have tenure j +T during the
ﬁrst period of the reform. This way of introducing temporary contracts resembles the 1995
15Note that the case T =0reduces to the benchmark economy.
18Argentinean labor market reform. The length of the trial period T is set to 4 to match the
six months temporary contracts introduced by that reform. Figure 2 shows the short-run
eﬀects of the reform while the third column of Table 1 shows its long-run eﬀects.
Figure 2.A shows, for j =0 ,...,T + J∗, the productivity thresholds ¯ z(j) that trigger
employment separation. We see that the productivity threshold for the new arrivals (i.e.
for j =0 ) is low, but that it increases over the trial period. This is quite intuitive: as the
worker gets closer to being subject to the separation taxes, the beneﬁts of being employed at
a given productivity level decreases relative to the value of search. Indeed, Figure 2.A shows
that there is a sharp increase in the productivity threshold right before the worker becomes
subject to the separation taxes. After the trial period is over, the productivity threshold
decreases with the tenure level as the separation taxes increase.
To evaluate the initial eﬀects of the reform, Figure 2.A also shows the productivity
thresholds that each initial type of worker would had if the benchmark regime were continued
for one more period. That is for j =0 , Figure 2.A shows the benchmark productivity
threshold ¯ z∗(0), and for j>Tit shows ¯ z∗(j − T).16 We see that the decrease in the
productivity threshold for workers with j =0leads to a substantial increase in the job-
acceptance rate in Figure 2.B. The reason this productivity threshold decreases is very simple:
Accepting a new job becomes less costly because agents are not subject to separation taxes
during their ﬁrst T periods of employment. However, the productivity thresholds of the
agents that have been employed during the period prior to the reform (i.e. agents with j>T)
increase. The reason is that they now have the possibility of leaving their positions in order
to restart a new trial period. In fact, we see in Figure 2.B that this leads to a spike in the job-
separation rate during the ﬁrst period of the reform. The increase in the job-separation rate is
substantially larger than the increase in the job-acceptance rate, and aggregate employment
starts decreasing during the ﬁrst period of the reform (contrary to the laissez-faire reform).
16Observe that there are no workers with tenure j between 1 and T during the ﬁrst period of the reform.
19Labor force participation increases because the trial periods lower the separation taxes, but
since the trial period is short the increase is relatively small (compared to the laissez-faire
economy). Despite the small increase in labor force participation, unemployment increases
substantially during the ﬁrst period of the reform due to the large increase in the job-
separation rate. In fact the unemployment rate increases by the same amount as it did in
the laissez-faire economy: from 15.0% to 17.1%.
Since most of the workers that are employed in the ﬁrst period of the reform have been
employed in the period previous to the reform (their initial j is larger than T)a n dt h e
productivity thresholds for this type of workers increase uniformly, we see in Figure 2.D that
aggregate productivity starts increasing on impact. However, output decreases due to the
decrease in employment.17
After the ﬁrst period of the reform, the job-separation rate starts to decrease as more
workers become employed in trial periods (which have relatively low productivity thresh-
olds), but ﬁve periods after the reform it begins to increase as workers start to leave their
employment positions before gaining permanent status. In the long-run, the increase in the
job-separation rate is larger than in the job-acceptance rate and the unemployment rate
increases from 15.0% to 15.7% (contrary to the laissez-faire economy).18 Employment is
roughly unchanged in the long-run because the larger unemployment rate is compensated
by the higher labor force participation. However, long-run output increases by 0.9% due
to the productivity gains. Observe that the there are no welfare gains of introducing an
Argentinean type of temporary contracts reform: the consumption equivalent gain is equal
to 0.01%.
17These results suggest that the labor market reforms introduced by Argentina in 1995 probably aggravated
the severity of the recession originated by the Mexican devaluation (commonly known as the “tequila eﬀect”).
18Observe that the temporary contracts generate substantially more job turnover than laissez-faire.
205.3. Temporary contracts of long duration
The Argentinean reform was quite timid in terms of the length of the temporary contracts
that it introduced, leading to zero welfare gains. Other countries, like France and Spain, in-
troduced temporary contracts of much longer durations. This is a considerable improvement
since the longer the temporary contracts, the closer to laissez-faire the long-run outcomes
will be. To illustrate this point this section considers temporary contracts with a very long
duration: mainly, a duration of 10 years (i.e. T =8 0 ). The fourth column of Table 1 indeed
shows that the long-run eﬀects of this type of temporary contracts are virtually the same as
laissez-faire. The intuition for this result is quite simple: With long temporary contracts,
it is very unlikely that a worker will ﬁnish the trial period before he leaves his job due to a
low productivity shock. As a consequence, the long-run job-acceptance and job-separation
decisions of most of the workers will be similar to those under laissez-faire. However, we will
see that the short-run dynamics are extremely diﬀerent.
Figure 3.A shows that the productivity threshold for j =0is signiﬁcantly lower than the
benchmark value ¯ z∗(0), leading to a substantial increase in the job-acceptance rate (for the
above reasons, the new threshold ¯ z(0) is actually the same as under laissez-faire). However,
the productivity thresholds of workers that were employed prior to the reform (i.e. those with
j>T) increase substantially relative to their benchmark values. The reason is that the value
of search increases quite signiﬁcantly (since workers can now regain employment under a long
trial period), while staying in a pre-reform employment leads to higher separation taxes over
time. As a consequence, there is a huge spike in the job-separation rate during the ﬁrst
period of the reform (see Figure 3.B), which translates into an immediate contraction of
9.5% in aggregate employment (see Figure 3.C).19 Labor force participation increases by the
same amount as under laissez-faire because workers expect that they will hardly ever ﬁnish
a trial period (thus avoiding the separation taxes). This large destruction of employment
19Note that Figure 3 has a diﬀerent scale from the rest of the ﬁgures.
21together with the substantial increase in labor force participation lead to a large increase in
unemployment. In fact, the unemployment rate jumps from 15.0% to 25.4% during the ﬁrst
period of the reform. The initial increase in productivity due to the separation of workers
from relatively bad islands is compensated by the large decrease in aggregate employment,
leading to a 6.4% decrease in output during the ﬁrst period of the reform..
Thus, we see that temporary contracts of long duration are able to reproduce laissez-faire
outcomes in the long-run but require a sharp recessionary adjustment in the short-run. The
welfare gains are smaller than under a full reform (because of the recessionary adjustment)
but remain positive: 0.14% in terms of consumption. However, policy makers will typically
be concerned about the negative short-term outcomes and will be reluctant to introduce this
type of reform. To guarantee that a reform is implemented and that the welfare gains are
closer to potential, it is important to design a reform that delivers positive outcomes both
in the long-run and the short-run. The next section explores one possibility.
5.4. New ﬂexible contracts with a freeze on previous separation taxes
This section introduces a labor market reform with the following characteristics. All the new
hires that take place after the reform become free of separation taxes. On the other hand, the
separation taxes of workers that were hired prior to the reform are frozen at their pre-reform
levels. Once these workers leave their pre-reform employments and pay their corresponding
separation taxes, they become free of any subsequent separation taxes in their new jobs.
The equations describing a competitive equilibrium for this regime are somewhat diﬀerent
than before. The value of a household member with tenure j in an island with productivity










,f o rj =0 ,...,J. (5.1)
This equation is similar to (3.8) except that the tenure level for tax purposes does not increase
22over time (since the separation taxes are now frozen).
Equations (3.9), (3.10), (3.11), (3.12), (3.13) and (3.17) remain the same as before. The















0),f o rj =1 ,...,J. (5.3)
Observe that when workers with tenure j>0 leave their islands, they never regain a positive
tenure again: j =0becomes an absorbing state.
Since we are interested in introducing this type of reform to the benchmark economy, the
separation taxes are given by
τ(j)=τ
∗(j) for j =0 ,...,J
∗,
and the initial distribution Ψ0 is given by
Ψ0(j,z)=Ψ
∗(j,z), for j =0 ,...,J
∗, and for all z,
where Ψ∗, J∗ and τ∗ are the steady state distribution, the upper bound on tenure levels and
the separation taxes for the benchmark economy, respectively. Observe that τ∗(0) = 0,s o
the new hires in the post-reform regime are permanently waived from paying any separation
taxes. Figure 4 shows the short-run eﬀects of the reform while the last column of Table 1
shows the long-run eﬀects.
Since the reform eventually leads to a laissez-faire equilibrium, the long-run eﬀects of
this reform are virtually the same as moving to laissez-faire at once.20 Recall that introduc-
20T h er e a s o nw h yt h el o n g - r u ne ﬀects are not the exactly same in both reforms is that they lead to diﬀerent
short-run dynamics and, consequently, to diﬀerent long-run assets.
23ing temporary contracts of long duration also led to laissez-faire outcomes in the long-run,
but involved a sharp labor market adjustment in the short-run. The key question will be
whether the partial reform considered in this section leads to a similar recessionary short-run
adjustment or not. Figure 4 provides the answer.
Figure 4.A depicts the productivity thresholds for the benchmark economy and for the
new regime, for j =0 ,...,J∗. It shows that the productivity threshold ¯ z(0) is much lower in
the new regime than in the benchmark economy. The reason for this is that the new hires will
never be subject to separation taxes. In fact the productivity threshold ¯ z(0) that corresponds
to the new regime is exactly the same as under laissez-faire, leading to the same (higher)
job-acceptance rate (see Figure 4.B). While this result is similar to that obtained under long
temporary contracts there is a very important diﬀerence: The productivity thresholds of
workers that have been employed prior to the reform ( i.e. those with j>0)a r em u c hl o w e r
in the new regime than in the benchmark economy (except for very high j’s). At ﬁrst sight
this may seem a surprising result: The value of search increases quite substantially due to
the fact that the new hires will never be subject to separation taxes again and this should
increase the productivity thresholds. However, since the separation taxes are now frozen, the
workers have no reason to leave their jobs as quickly as they did in the benchmark economy.
This last eﬀect happens to dominate and the productivity thresholds of workers with j>0
decrease quite signiﬁcantly.
The decrease in threshold levels for j>0 leads to a reduction in the job-separation
rate in the ﬁrst period of the reform. With the lower job-separation rate and the higher
job-acceptance rate, aggregate employment increases during that ﬁrst period. The decrease
in productivity thresholds (except for very high j’s) lowers aggregate productivity. However,
output increases due to the signiﬁcant increase in employment. Labor force participation
increases by the same amount as under laissez-faire because of the removal of the separation
taxes from all the new hires. This increase is so large that it compensates for the lower job
24destruction rate, and increases unemployment. In fact, the unemployment rate jumps from
15.0% to 16.2% during the ﬁrst period of the reform, a somewhat lower increase than in the
laissez-faire reform.
Thus, contrary to the temporary contracts of long duration, this partial reform generates
similar outcomes as the laissez-faire reform, both in the long-run and the short-run, and
leads to the same welfare gains. By avoiding the tough short-run adjustment required by the
long temporary contracts, this type of partial reform represents a very useful second-best
alternative.
6. Conclusions
This paper has analyzed the eﬀects of introducing labor market ﬂexibility into a small open
economy subject to tenure-increasing separation taxes. Diﬀerent reforms were considered:
1) the elimination of all separation costs, 2) the introduction of temporary contracts, and 3)
the elimination of the separation costs from all new hires while freezing them on the workers
that were hired prior to the reform. Calibrating the model economy to Argentinean data, the
following results were obtained. First, the potential welfare gains of removing all separation
taxes in Argentina are small: only 0.22% in terms of consumption. However, the eﬀects
on output and employment are sizable: in the long-run they increase by 3.24% and 3.77%,
respectively. Second, temporary contracts of 6 months duration, like those introduced by the
1995 Argentinean labor market reform, have negligible eﬀects on employment, output and
welfare. Third, introducing temporary contracts of very long duration can lead to positive
welfare gains and to the same long-run outcomes as a full reform but involve a sharp short-
run recession. Fourth, a partial labor market reform that removes separation taxes on the
new hires and freezes them on workers that were hired prior to the reform leads to the
same welfare gains and long-run outcomes as a full reform without generating a recessionary
adjustment. Thus, the paper ﬁnds that this type of partial labor market reform constitutes
25an excellent second-best alternative to a full reform.
The main reason why temporary contracts of long duration generate a sharp recession,
while the ﬂexible new contracts (with a freeze on separation taxes) do not, is that they
aﬀect job-separation decisions in very diﬀerent ways. When long temporary contracts are
introduced, the value of search increases because the workers can start long trial periods
with zero separation taxes. Given that the temporary contracts regime continues to penalize
permanent workers for staying in their jobs (their separation taxes continue to increase with
tenure), the higher value of search leads many permanent workers to leave their pre-reform
jobs right after the reform is implemented.
The ﬂexible new contracts with a freeze on separation taxes also increases the value of
search (this time because the new jobs will never be subject to separation taxes). This tends
to increase the job-separation rate. However, the freeze on separation taxes removes the
same-job penalty, inducing workers to stay in their jobs much longer. This eﬀect is so large
that it dominates the higher value of search and leads to a lower job-separation rate when
the reform is implemented.
While this paper provided important insight about the short-run eﬀects of labor market
reforms, there are two caveats to the analysis. The ﬁrst one is the assumption of perfect risk
sharing between a large number of household members. While it is quite plausible that the
extended family in Argentina provides a more important safety network than in many other
countries, the full risk-sharing assumption is rather extreme. However, the introduction of
borrowing constraints should not change the results quite substantially. The reason is that
the average duration of unemployment is very low in Argentina: only 4 months, as reported
by Galiani and Hopenhayn [10]. Thus, similarly to other models calibrated to U.S. data, the
workers would end up self-insuring quite well using their own savings.
Another caveat to the analysis is the assumption that labor is the only factor of produc-
tion. Veracierto [18] shows that, in a closed economy, the presence of capital can substantially
26aﬀect the short-run dynamics after a labor-market reform is introduced. However, it is un-
likely that a similar result would be obtained for a small open economy. An important
reason why the presence of capital aﬀects labor supply decisions in a closed economy is that
higher investment requires lower consumption. It is to mitigate the consumption adjustment
associated with the higher investment that agents decide to increase their labor supply along
the transitionary path. In a small open economy this channel is absent: Due to international
borrowing and lending, changes in the stock of capital do not require consumption adjust-
ments. In fact, consumption always jumps to its new steady state level after a labor market
reform. Given the absence of this important channel, given that determining empirically
relevant capital adjustment costs for Argentina in the mid 90’s would be a diﬃcult task, and
given the computational complexity that it would entail, I leave the introduction of capital
to future research.
A. Appendix
This appendix describes the computational algorithm. Substituting equation (3.12) in equa-
tions (3.8), the values v(j,z) can be obtained using standard recursive methods. The value
of non-employment θ is then obtained from (3.12). These values are suﬃcient to determine
the employment decision rules G(j,z;Ψ) in equation (3.9).
Now, guess a value for out-of-the-labor-force H (which is known to be constant along the





























for t =0 ,1,...,T,w h e r eT is a large number such that all variables have approximately
converged. Given the initial asset level A0, compute the consumption level b C that is obtained














Calculate the consumption level e C that is obtained from equation (3.13), i.e. which
satisﬁes
θ = BH
−φ e C + βθ.
Compare b C with e C.I fb C 6= e C, guess a new value for out-of-the-labor force H and start
again. Continue until a root H∗ to the function b C(H) − e C(H) is obtained. This can be
implemented using standard root ﬁnding methods.
28Table 1
Steady State Eﬀects
Benchmark Laissez- Temp. contr. Temp. contr. New ﬂex
economy faire (T =4 ) (T =8 0 ) contracts
Job acceptance rate 100.00 105.98 108.57 105.98 105.98
Job separation rate 100.00 101.78 114.48 102.52 101.78
Unemployment rate 15.00 14.48 15.68 14.57 14.48
Employment 100.00 103.77 100.08 103.67 103.77
Unemployment 100.00 99.65 105.52 100.28 99.65
Labor Force 100.00 103.15 100.90 103.16 103.15
Output 100.00 103.24 100.86 103.24 103.24
Consumption 100.00 103.23 100.82 103.16 103.22
Productivity 100.00 99.49 100.78 99.58 99.49
Debt 100.00 103.83 104.50 111.59 104.27
Welfare Gain 0.00 0.22 0.01 0.14 0.21
29FIGURE 1: Laissez-faire
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